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The Elizabeth Bouvia Case: 
Legalizing Euthanasia by Lethal Injection 
Rev. Robert Barry, O.P., Ph.D. 
Father Barry, Linacre's book review editor, is working in the 
Program in Religious Studies in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 
at the University of llIinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
Elizabeth Bouvia is a 28-year-old quadriplegic who suffers from 
cerebral palsy. In 1982, she petitioned a court to order Riverside Hospital 
near Los Angeles to provide her with hygienic care and painkillers so that 
she could starve herself to death, but this petition was rejected by the 
court.' 
Earlier this year, Mrs. Bouvia returned to court because she had a 
nasogastric feeding tube inserted by physicians at High Desert Hospital in 
Lancaster, California. 2 The hospital and her physicians did this because 
her weight had fallen to 70 pounds or less, and they feared she was trying to 
starve herself to death. Mrs. Bouvia, with assistance of attorneys of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, petitioned to have this tube removed 
because she felt that it was intrusive, unnecessary and burdensome.) She 
claimed that she was not intending to starve herself to death , but that she 
was trying to feed herself orally.4 This form of feeding, ' however, was 
complicated by the fact that she was unable to retain orally administered 
food on many occasions. s 
High Desert Hospital resisted her petition and argued in court against 
removing the feeding tube on the grounds that Mrs. Bouvia's real intention 
was to kill herself by starvation, that her death would result from its 
withdrawal , and that physicians had a duty to provide what was just 
normal and minimal care.6 The California Second District Appellate 
Court rejected the hospital's argument and ordered the feeding tube 
removed. And it seems from the court's opinion that the hospital also was 
prohibited from transferring her to another institution as long as she 
wished to remain there, just because her treatment decisions were contrary 
to hospital policy.7 
We should recall that it was this very same three-judge panel which 
decided the Barber v. California case and brought about the cycle of 
withdrawal of feeding cases .8 It now appears that this panel has laid the 
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legal foundations for physicians to give patients lethal injections upon 
request, for as we shall see, it held that hea lth care professionals have a 
duty to help suffering patients find a quick and painless death if they desire 
it. It also appears that this decision will bring us a cycle of cases dealing 
with the provision of lethal injections upon request by health care 
professionals to chronically ill , handicapped and terminally ill patients. 
In what follows , I would like to review the court's opinion and then 
comment on the case. In closing, suggestions for measures that could be 
taken to prevent the legalization of mercy killing by omission of morally 
required care and treatment or by positive action will be made. 
I 
The Holdings of the Court. 
The court upheld Bouvia's right to refuse even life-sustaining feeding, 
and it even required the hospital to provide a substantia l part of her care, 
such as alleviating her pain and suffering. To deny her the treatments she 
requested would violate her constitutional right to privacy, according to 
this court: 
Here Eli za beth Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment or life-support 
through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medical decision for her 
phys icia ns to make. Neither is it a lega l question whose soundness is to be 
reso lved by lawyers or judges. It is not a conditional right subject to a pproval by 
ethi cs co mmittees or courts of law. It is a moral a nd philosophical decis io n that , 
being a competen t adult, is hers a lone. 
The court noted that Bouvia was unable to enter a private hospital 
because she was without means, and the hospital could not deny her relief 
from pain and suffering merely because she was refusing some treatments 
they wished to provide: 
We d o not doubt the sincerity of [the hospita l a nd medical personnel's] mora l a nd 
et hica l beli efs, or their sincere belief in the positio n they have taken in thi s case. 
However, if the right of the pati ent to se lf-d etermination as to his own medica l 
treat ment is to ha ve an y mea ning at a ll , it must be paramount to the interests of 
the pat ient's hospital and d octors ... The right of a competent adult to refuse 
medica l trea tment is a constitutionally guaranteed right which must not be 
abridged .1o 
The appellate court grounded its order to remove the feeding tube on the 
right to refuse medical treatments , and it construed this right very broadly: 
The right to refuse medical treatment is basic a nd fundamental. It is recognized as 
a part of the right of privacy protected by bot h the sta te and federa l constitutions 
. . . Its exercise requires no one's approva l. It is not merely one vote subject to 
being overridden by medical o pinion. " 
In holding that this right to refuse even food and water is elemental, the 
court clearly meant that this right was not to be abridged, restricted or 
limited in any way. The primary authorities cited for this viewpoint were 
the cases of Barber v. Superior Court and Bartling v. Superior Court. 12 
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The court argued that the right to refuse treatments was not to be 
restricted , and even certain death resulting from a refusal of treatment 
should not be a llowed to impede its exercise: 
A ll dec isions permitting cessation of medica l trea tment or li fe -support 
procedures to so me degree hastened the arrival of dea th. In part , at least , thi s was 
permitted beca use the quality of life during the time remaining in those cases 
has been terribly diminished to the po int of hopelessness, use lessness , 
unenjoya bility and frustration. She, as the patient , lying helpless ly in bed , unable 
to care for herse lf, may consider her existence meaningless.13 
The court argued in this manner, even though a number of other courts 
have differed with this judgment. In Brophy v. Massachusetts, for 
example, Judge David Kopelman argued that a purported declaration of a 
desire to refuse treatments should not be construed to mean that feeding 
should be withheld. 14 And In the Matter a/Claire Conroy, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court argued that feeding could only be removed from a 
terminally ill incompetent patient, but not from the competent and 
nonterminal. 15 
The a ppellate court claimed that Bouvia had a right to live out her life 
with dignity and peace. 16 It suggested that her decision not to accept tube 
feeding was not a decision to commit suicide, but one to let nature take its 
course. 17 It suggested that she had wanted to commit suicide, but she failed 
to carry out that desire when she had the opportunity. Rather, it claimed 
that Bouvia was merely resigning herself to an early death , and was not 
trying to kill herself. 18 But this is highly doubtful , as her weight loss seemed 
to be due more to her refusal to eat than to difficulties she has in retaining 
foods. If this is true, then her rejection of the feeding tube would be 
suicida l, just as any refusal of oral feeding by her wou ld be suicidal as well. 
The court should have adopted a more protective course and held that 
feeding had to be given because her true intentions were unclear. 
The court gave consideration to the possibility that Bouvia had an 
intention to commit suicide, but this motive was not to be permitted to 
inhibit the exercise of her right to refuse medical treatments. 19 The court 
simply dismissed assertions that the right to refuse medical treatments 
should be limited to those who are termina lly ill: 
Moreover, as the Barrling decision holds, there is no practical or logical reason to 
limit the exe rcise of this right to " terminal" patients. The right to refuse treatment 
does not need the sanction or approva l by a ny legislative act, directing how and 
when it sha ll be exercised .'o 
The court pointed out that there was no foundation for such a restriction, 
and it asserted that previous cases had placed no restrictions on the right of 
a patient to refuse medical treatments.2 1 The appellate court cited 
statements of the American Hospital Association , the Los Angeles County 
Medical Society and the President's Commission, among other sources, to 
justify its opinion, even though some sources such as the Commission did 
not explicitly consider whether the refusal of treatments could be 
permitted if suicide were to be a result of a treatment refusal. 22 
August , 1986 15 
The court did mention the recently announced opinion of the Judicial 
Council which held that feeding could only be removed from a comatose 
patient, and not from a competent patient like Bouvia. It also cited the 
opinion of the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association 
which declared that the physician was to sustain life and relieve suffering. 23 
When neither of these are possible, then the choice of the family or legal 
representative of the incompetent person was to prevail. What this means 
in practice is that authorization from one of these to bring death by act or 
omission should be respected, as the physician is obviously not able to 
sustain life or relieve pain in those circumstances. 
In a rather casual manner, the court rejected numerous arguments put 
forth by the hospital for providing Bouvia with assisted feeding. 24 The 
court rejected the view that there were limits to the right to refuse medical 
treatment because: 
.. [a] competent adult patient has the lega l right to refuse medical treatment .. 
The patient's interests and desires are the key ingred ients of the decision making 
process. 25 
It rejected the argument that Bouvia had been admitted to a public facility 
and was therefore involving the state in her suicidal action which 
prohibited the hospital from cooperating in the suicidal act of rejecting 
life-sustaining medically providable food and fluids. 26 It rejected the view 
that she was not comatose or terminal and was truly trying to starve herself 
to death . It rejected the argument that she was asking for medical 
treatment which prohibited her from picking and choosing those 
treatments she wanted.27 
The court also rejected arguments that there were state interests in 
preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting innocent third parties, and 
maintaining the ethical standards of the medical profession that could 
limit her right to refuse medical treatments. 28 To justify rejecting these 
claims, it relied on the Bartling and Barber cases, hich was a rather 
superficial way of dealing with the serious problems involved in this case. 
The court acknowledged that Elizabeth Bouvia could live for 15 or 20 
years if feeding was continued .29 But it discounted the importance of this 
probability by arguing that the length of time a patient was expected to live 
was irrelevant to the right to refuse care such as the nasogastric feeding 
tube: 
It is incongruous, if not monstrous , for medical practitioners to assert their right 
to preserve a life that someone else must live, or more accurately, endure, for " 15 
to 20 years." We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to inflict such an 
ordeal upon anyone30 
The court agreed that the withdrawal of medical treatments usually 
hastened death, but it argued that the poor quality of Bouvia's life justified 
her decision to reject the feeding tube: 
16 
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the qua li ty of her life has been diminished to the point 
of hopelessness, uselessness , unenjoyabiIity and frustration .. . Does it matter if it 
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be 15 to 20 years, 15 to 20 months , or 15 to 20 days if such a life has been physically 
destroyed and its quality, dignity and purpose gone?" 
It explicitly admitted that her decision to refuse the feeding tube was made 
out of a motive to bring death , but it denied that such a motive could be 
used to limit the right to refuse treatments. 
The appellate panel decided that it was not necessary to define or dwell 
at length on what constituted suicide. It noted that aiding suicide was a 
crime, but it asserted that all cases of assisted suicide involved positive 
actions taken by individuals and these were different from the exercising of 
a constitutional right to refuse a form of care or treatment. 32 By pointing 
this out, the court seemed to be asserting that the withdrawing offood and 
fluids simply could not be considered as assisted suicide ul1der the law 
because it was a medical decision and not a positive act of killing. It noted 
that this was the teaching of the Barber and Bartling courts, as if these were 
the final authorities. 
In many places, the appellate panel's decision appeared to be little more 
than pro-euthanasia propaganda. Judge Lynn Compton wrote a separate 
concurring opinion which was an outright endorsement of mercy killing 
and assisted suicide: 
Eli zabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she prefers 
death to continued existence in her he lpless and , to her, intolerable condition. I 
believe she has an absol ute right to effectuate that decision. The state and the 
medical profession instead of frustrating her desire, should be attempting to 
relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and 
dignity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-sta rvation to achieve 
her objective is in itself inhumane. 
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies so long 
as the rights of others are not affected. That right should , in my opinion, include 
the ability to enl ist ass istance from ot hers , including the medical profession in 
making death as painless and quick as possible. 
That ability should not be hampered by the state's threat to ' impose lega l 
sanctions on those who might be disposed to lend assistance. 
The medical profession, freed of the threat of governmental or legal reprisal, 
would, I am sure, have no difficulty in accommodating an individual in 
Elizabeth's situation." 
He concluded his opinion with the assertion that "[I]fthere is ever a time 
when we ought to be able to get the 'government off our backs' it is when 
we face death - either by choice or otherwise."34 
II 
Analysis of the Court's Holdings 
There are distressing elements in this decision. First, the Bouvia decision 
has apparently denied the hospital and staff the right to be free from 
participation in the suicides of patients admitted to facilities where they 
serve. In this respect, the Bouvia court has gone far beyond what even the 
courts would permit in abortion cases, for the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
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require that individuals participate in abortions against their consciences. 
If the Bouvia decision is allowed to stand, it would mean that health care 
professionals in public institutions could be released from their positions 
for refusing to participate in what they understand to be suicides. The 
ultimate implication of this decision is that public hospitals may, in fact, 
become state supported euthanasia centers. 
Second, the court seemed to believe that there was no duty incumbent 
upon the state to take reasonable measures to prevent what appeared to be 
suicide. The court here explicitly granted Bouvia the right to commit 
suicide by refusing to be fed. This court has apparently renounced any 
obligations to prevent the seriously ill, handicapped or terminally ill from 
committing suicide. The appellate panel narrowly focused on the right to 
refuse medical treatments, and it did not give any consideration to the duty 
of health care professionals to take reasonable measures to prevent what 
they consider to be suicidal actions. The court has also ignored much of 
living will legislation which has excluded nutrition and fluids from the 
class of electable medical treatments. 
Third, it is clear that the court has endorsed the "pure content less patient 
autonomy" model of the physician-patient relationship. This model holds 
that the physician is to abide by patient wishes irrespective of their 
content. 35 This model is very detrimental to health care professionals 
because it forces them to violate what they perceive to be their professional 
obligations and duties. This decision-making model is an overreaction to 
the "Golden Age" of medicine where the patient had few rights to reject a 
decision made about his or her care by the physician. Rather than 
endorsing this pure contentless patient autonomy model, the court should 
have endorsed the covenant model of the patient-physician relationship 
which would stress the mutual duties of health care professionals and 
patients in making medical decisions. 36 
Rev. John R. Connery, S.J., has emphasized the notion that the issue at 
stake in these cases is the quality of treatment given to me'dically dependent 
and vulnerable persons and not the quality of their lives Y What he meant 
by this was that courts have a jurisprudential obligation to promote the 
highest quality care for medically dependent persons and that this 
consideration should dominate concerns for quality of life or privacy. The 
Bouvia court stressed the notion that medical decision-making was to be 
guided by the patient's wishes and desires , rather than by the canons of 
medical ethics or of high quality medical care. Rather than encouraging 
them to do that, according to Connery's views, legal decisions in these 
cases should have been concerned with mandating the highest quality care 
and treatment for one such as Bouvia. 
Conclusion 
The Bouvia decision will prove to be a landmark decision, drawing us 
closer to fully legalized mercy killing. Judge Compton's concurring 
opinion has established the legal foundation for lethal injections, and 
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virtually any state court in the land could invoke his opinion to support a 
decision to give a lethal injection to a disabled person. 
This decision will have a profound impact on medically vulnerable and 
handicapped persons , for it will encourage them to follow Bouvia's 
example and order all care and treatment removed or withheld when they 
grow tired of their condition and suffering. Within the health care 
professions, it has undermined opposition to mercy killing by ordering 
public hospitals to participate against its stated policies in what it perceives 
to be a suicide. 
This decision makes it clear that the strongest proponents of mercy 
killing will not tolerate the imposition of any limitations on those who wish 
to end their lives. They do not believe that assisted suicide should be denied 
anyone, and they clearly hold that it should be provided for those who are 
not terminally ill, but who consider their lives too painful and burdensome 
to continue. 
To counter this movement and to prevent the legalization of suicide and 
mercy killing, it is necessary to remove life-sustaining medically providable 
nutrition and fluids from the legal class of medical treatments that can be 
declined by patients. If suicide by omission of life-sustaining medically 
providable food and water is to be legally prevented, it will be necessary to 
legally define these as aspects of normal, routine customary care and basic 
patient maintenance. 38 It is necessary to do this in order to preserve the 
right of patients to decline extraordinary and radically burdensome 
treatments, but to also require them to consent to care and treatments 
whose provision prevents their committing suicide. 
It would also be wise to enact legislation at the state and federal levels 
which would require the provision of medically providable food and fluids 
to patients who are not able to take these orally except when their 
provision would hasten or cause death. This would prohibit refusal offood 
and water in situations where their rejection would be equivalent to 
suicide. Finally, it appears that it will soon be necessa~y to strengthen 
assisted suicide laws so that it would be considered a felony not only to aid, 
assist and abet suicide, but also to procure any instrument or potion for 
another person, knowing that it would be used for suicidal purposes .39 
With the emergence of the euthanasia movement at this time, we have 
seen our society come full circle from abortion. With legal endorsement of 
abortion, it became legal to perform directly lethal omissions or 
commissions against human life as it was entering the fullness of being. 
Now, with the rise of the euthanasia movement, many are contending that 
it should be legal to perform directly lethal omissions or commissions 
against life in its twilight. With the legalization of abortion, millions were 
killed simply because they were unborn . But with the dawn of euthanasia, 
we must fear that just as many will die because they are infirm, 
handicapped , terminally ill or too costly. 
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